The Prince and the railwaymen: the origins of the 1920 
Introduction
On 2R April 1920. the Prince ofWales was n1arooned at Rotorua. Princes are not usually stranded in New Zealand towns: hut with no trains. His Royal Highness, a very en1harrassed Prime Minister and 8 000 visitors had no option. They were stuck.
Much of th e blame for this sudden addition to Rotorua's population could he laid at the feet of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS).
1 They had done the unthinkable-chosen to strike during a Royal Tour.
Neither striking nor stranding passengers were part of the ASRS's norn1al agenda. However. 28 April signalled the end of 30 strike-free years -years in the ASRS had proclaimed the ballot box to he their preferred n1ethod of redress.
Explaining this sudden change in policy and its dramatic results is the object of this paper. Events did occur in [1919] [1920] which irritated the railwaymen. but these happenings were not the sole cause of the 1920 strike. For years. the ASRS's list of grievances had been growing. For yea~s. Government and the Railways Depart1nent had chosen to ignore. their pleas. Thus any explanation of the events of April 1920 demands an analysis of the union's history. beginning with its conservative stance of 1913.
1913
1lJ13 saw New Zealand's labour movement divided. On one side were those whose sy ndicalist views yielded them firm supporters of the strike weapon: on the other were those opposed to the syndicalist ideology. The ASRS executive was violently opposed to syndicalism and with 7 114 members the union comprised the most numerically strong antisyndicalist group.
Despite the divisions. both the militants and the moderates believed that New Zealand's labour movement needed to be more unified . Their concern led to the Unity Congress of July invited to thi\ congress and it was here that tht:ir attidue to the strike weapon was graphically illustrated .
A resolution empowering the UFOL to call its rnernbers out on strike whenever nece sa:y was passed on July :\ the fifth day of the congress. and the ASRS delegates walked out 1 n protest. In their view political action should have heen at the top rather than the hottom of the congress\ agenda since the strike could result in traget.ly and failure as it had in Waihi i~ .1912. Also they had to consider their own position. The ASRS had always found constataonal methods of redress effective. and subscription to UFOL policies could spell the end of a cordial relationship with the Government and the Railways Department.
Disagrecn1ent hetween the UFOL and the ASRS did not end with the Unity Congress. The ASRS executive clearly dcn1onstrated their views Juring the 1913 watersiders· dispute: a dispute \\hich rapidly escalated to a national crisis. The UFOL realised the hattie could be won if the ASRS joined the s trike but despite their pleas. the ASRS executive stood unmoved: the principle we \tood for then (i.e. at the Unity Congress) is the principle we n1aintain today. fully hclie\·ing that whatever disabilities we are suffering can be settled through the hal lot box. and that instead of the strike being the first move. it should not he used until all other lcgitin1atc rncans have failed (Railway review. 1 2 0 e c e 111 b c r ll) 1 3 . p. 50 7 ) .
Why did the ASRS hold the~e views? A hrief cxan1 i nation of the union ·s history should an~\\er thi s question. The ASRS was first organised in 18R6 and any railway servant was eligible to join. Howc\cr it wa" severely weakened in 1 R40 after members became involved in the maritime st rike. Dcrecognition had followed and some members were di missed. Re1 nsta tcmen t \J. a" con ti ngcn t upon their declaring the error of thci r ways. agreeing to obey a 11 raih\ay "en icc rule~ and pron1ising not to join the ~ociety as constituted (Henning. 1984. p. 57) .
In lX94. under a Govcrnrnent supportive of union formation. the society was recognised once more. There were. however. conditions: -arfiliation -with other union~ wa~ not permitte<.J : -on ly railwa] rmplo)t:es could join: -the ">ouet) had to Lonlinc it' -1 attentions to matters affecting railway employee~.
Ho\J.C\er. co ntrary to Roth·s assertion ( 1973. p. 17) . the railwayrnen did not promise to abjure strike tactics (Raillvay review, 3 July, 1894. p. 5). But they might as well have. given their behaviour O\er the next 30 years and their removal of all references to strikes from their rules.
Follo\J.ing recognition the ~ocicty gained strength. Men1bership grew and a superannuation '-~Cherne \J.a s organised. There were son1e losses. though . The Railways Departrnent clerical cn1plo)ce' (i.e. the Fir\t Oi\ision) broke away and forn1ed their own organisation in 1894-the Raih\lay Oflicer' Institute. Later engine-drivers. fircrnen and cleaners laid plans for a \epa rate hod; to represent themselves. B; llJ 13. I in every l 0 New Zealand union rnemhcr~ belonged to the ASRS. but the union's n1ernhcrship was confined to the Sel:ond D1 vision ( i .c. rna n ual) ra i I way workers.
However. a large n1emhership was not the key reason why the ASRS chose to eschew the ~trike weapon More importantly. there were kw issue' O\cr which they would want to strike. In the words o f the \Ociety's journaL Railway review. Nc\\1 Zealand railwayrnen had better condition\ and better pay than their O\cr<,eas counterparts. Besides. the society boasted a relati\el) cordial relatitH1'-lhip with both the Government and the Railways Departrnent. The Liberal. ~o\ernrnt:nt h~td supported the union 's growth and devclopn1ent. and had always been \\dltng to II\ten.to 1ts representatives. Although the Liht:rals had been replaced in 1912 by Massey s co nsef\ att\e Reforn1 Governn1ent. few of Massey's decisions had given the rail\J. ay men ca use lor corn pi a in t. In fact. M asscy pleased the ASRS by passing on conl:essions agreed to \J.ith the Liberals. These were crnbodied in the regulations accon1panying the Go\ern~l~nt Railways A.n: endn1ent Act 1~13 . ~hey provided for an incrcast: in perquisites and a n11ntr11un1 salaf) of liOO perannurn lorrall\J.ayrncn over21. Most irnportantly. the new 2 The fa ct 1t wa~ ~relt "U niteu Federation of Luhor" reflected the American influence.
The Prince and the railwaymen 3 regulations provided for increased (but lin1ited) opportunity for the Second Division workers to h~ prornoted to the clerical First Division. To the union's executive. this represented a positive response hy Government to the n_ccds of ~econ~ Division railwayn~cn.
The rai lwavn1en valued these new hcnchts. benefits whtch the ASRS cxccuttve knew could he tasily lost. it had happened in lXlJO and could happen again. In their view little could he caincd frorn the use oft he strike weapon . However. the balance between the costs and benefits ;r striking was to change in the 7 years following 1913 and it is to an exarnination of these cha ng~s we now turn.
The winds of change
The 191 3 Governtncnt regulations both pleased the ASRS and filled its rnernbers with expectation. Many itnprovernents had been rnade: surely they could expect rnore in the ncar future. Although the regulations did provide for some irnprovemcnt in the working conditions of the Second l)n i ~ion rai lwayn1en. they also provided for the con tin uancc of practices which the railwayn1cn considered to he unfair. e.g. the n1ere existence of the harrier between the First and Second Oi\ j,ion~ and the rule stipulating "no person in the sevice (could) take an active part in politics other than recording his vote at elections .. (New Zealand ga:eue. 1913. voliL p. 3619) . Dis atisfaction \Vith these and other restrictions served to intensify the railwayrnen\ irritation with their working co nditions during the war years. However. a rnore irnportant rea on for their increasing anger was the rising cost of living.
Retai l prices had been rising steadily since 1911 and had increased by 10 percent by 1914. Food and rent cos ting 19s lOd in l90R cost 2ls 7d in 1914 (Oepartn1ent of Statistics. 1915. p. 787) and it was hardly surpri sing that the railwaymen. who had received on average a one ~hilling increase during the period. \Vere beginning to con1plain.
The obvious solu ti o n to the n1oney prohlen1 wa s to ask W H Herrics. the Minister of Railways. for a wage increase. He ·was duly visited in July 1914 and a one shilling per day increase rcqucqeJ. The visit was unsucc essful-Hcrries argued that the concessions given to railway casuab under the Governn1cnt Railways Amendment Act 1913, had cost the Govern n1 en t £120 000 and no further increase could he justified.
However it was not long before ASRS den1anc..ls came to an abrupt halt. When the war began. industrial demands were replaced by patriotic fervour and sacrifice. As soon as war was declared th e union executive announced their intention not to press any of their former demands. The executive passed resolutions:
That the Pre ident and General Secretary wait on the Minister of Railways and explain to him that in view of the present Imperial c risis. we do not at the prese nt juncture intend pressing any of o ur claims on him (Railway review. ')l August lYI4. p. 351 ) . . and the n1c1nhership had to be inforn1cd of the in1portance of "doing the right thing":
The crisis is a ..,erious one. perhaps the most serious those men in the service have ever known of and we have our duty to perform. The first part of that duty is to avoid taking any action at a lime which will in any way harass the powers that he. knowing they have greater trouhles than ours to occupy their minds in the very interest of the Empire itself (Railway revie-w. IR September 1914. p. 3Y9) .
Th e railwaymen remained silent about their pay until April 1915 when they deLided "sorn eth i ng .. had to be done. Ret a i I prices had increased hy I 0.5 percent between I 914 and 1915 largely as a result of the war and the railwaymen had still not received any increase in pay. Governrnent wa s not totally disinterested in their plight. Its response was an inquiry into the cost or I ivi ng in 1914 and the Cost of Living Act. 19 I 5. which provided for a Board ofTrade to .. offset the conditions brought about hy war" ( Departn1ent of Statistics. 1916. p. 362) . Unfortunately the Board had few " real teeth"' and increases in retail prices continued to erode the purchasing power of the working population 's wages.
The railwaymen\ complaints were not restricted to pay. The latter half of 1915 was c hara cterised hy di~content with the Railway Appeal Board. abortive discussions regarding other Conditions. and the first Stirrings or a n1ore rnilitant brand or discontent were heing recorded in Railway review.
PM Revell "Workers unite"
The ASRS executive ~oon realised the old constitiona 1 methods of redress were not working. Their own ~trength had proved insufficient. clea rly a new app.roach to ?iff!culties was needed. Although the ASRS executive never e rnhraced the revolutio nary pnnctples of marxism and "yndicali'-tn1. they did adopt the emphasis on unity characteristic of these approaches.
. . . . What steps did the railwayrnen take in this direction? Thet r first pnon ty was tot ncrease the ASRS\ men1ber!)hip. A campaign to recruit mo re members was initiated by the union's executi\e at the end of 191 5 and a moderate degree of succe~~ achieved. No doubt a central reason for the carnpaign was the fear of lo\ing n1crnbers and funds -railwaymen were joining the Expeditionary Force in increasing numbers. A second perceived threat to the ASRS \\-as the growth of the Locomotive Engine-drivers. Firen1en and Cleaners Association (EFCA).
Official recognition wa<; fir\t sought hy the EFCA in 1909 when they pleaded before a Railwa y~ Committee that the ASRS had failed to repre\ent them. Some commentaries have argued that the EFC A wanted a more radical approach to unionisn1 than the ASRS (Water~on . 1959. p. 14S). however th e available evidence suggests otherwise. For examp le, the comme nts of the EFCA General Secretary reOect a co nserva tive view and are worth quoting:
The Amalgamated SoLiety here has practically the '\a me object in view CJS the lahour leaders in Amenca when they wanted to get a ll the worker\ into one union so they could go out on 1\tnke .. I mu~.;t 'a'r that ~.;trike'-! are altogether out of the question. a nd on hehalf of the Engtne-dnver~. Ftremen and Cleaner~ Union I may .say that such a thing never entered our head" I a~.; Secretal) of that organtsatlon. will never make use of a strike as a weapon to he used Jgdtn\t the Government (Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives.
1-6. MLArle)-)
The 1909 btJ 'Aa\ un\uccessful but by 191 3 official recognition had been obtained. The ASRS alway\ hopeJ ff'CA rnembers would '\ee th e light'' and '" return to the fold". Meetings were held where the ASRS executive aJ\ocated an1algan1ation of the 2 groups. the EFCA disagreed-the; wanted to retain their independence The EFCA did support a federation of the 2 bodie~ but thi~ Jid not please the ASRS No co nclu~ion was reached and hostility between the 2 group~ continued.
Unity ideal\ were not re\tricted to railway workers. Conunon war-tin1e proh l ern~ nece~sitated the comrnon search for solut1on" and the ASRS began to look to other groups for support. Other union" were 3lso interested in a rn ore unifieJ approach to probkrns and as a re ult. 1 new group" were forn1ed.
Fir~t the Courcil of Ne'A Zealand State Sen ice Ao...sociations (CSSA). organised in llJ16 'Aas a unified re\ponse to con1n1on problem~ of "tate "en ants. It repre~ented 26 000 n1en1bers of the Publ1c Sen1ce As~ociation. Post anJ Telegraph OtTicer,· Association. the New Zealand Educational ln \titute. Ratl\.\a} Officers In~titutc and ASRS Fron1 th e beginning its chief role in\olved pres\unng Go\emn1ent fo r cost of li\ ing adju\tn1cnt".
Secondly. the railwa;rnen became involveJ in the New /ealand Transport v\'orkt:rs· Ad\i\ory Board (TWAB) which was nurtured under the guiding hanJ or··sig" Jirn Roherts and the Watcrstdcrs' I~ederation. A confe rence of railwayrn en. drivers. tramwayn1en and waterside worJ..cro... hegan in Wellington on 26 June 1916 and a constition was drawn up. Among its objective\, the BoanJ aimed to organi\e all transport workers along the lin es of indu~try and the 1dea of"One Big Union" Jon1inatL'd discussion. 3 The EFCA could not abide the "One Btg Indus tria 1 U n 10n" concept because of i b craft basis and later declined to a flil ia te.
The ASRS. on the other hand. had 4 gooJ reasons for affiliating with the Board. First. the comrnon dtfficulties faced by tran sport workers. in the face of an unsyn1pathetic Governrnent. demanded a untted front Second. the Pre\idcnt and General Secretary believed the ·rw1 \B CO~ld be effectne 111 stopp1ng \trikes a~ it enahled the intCf\.'C ntion of a third party in disputes. Th 1 rd. although 1 t \\-a~ a term of the AS Rs·, recognition that th e socit:ty would not a ffil inte with any ?ther union . n10\t of tho'le who had Jen1andcd this rule had long since retired. Finally. out\1de lahour group" haJ become le\~ radiC<ll in their iJcology enabling a .. rnceting of the The .. ~ne Big Union" Jdc~ll continually dominated the Transport Work~rs Advisory Board. Accord 1 ng to R oh~rt..., the ph ra~e m~a nt "o rganisatio n on the lines of 1 nd u~tl)', with full democratic control by the rank and file ".
The Prince and the railwaymen 5 minLb .. hetw~en railwavn1cn and otht:r workers. With the dcvclopnH:nt or the New Zealand L 41 hour Party in ILJI6.'··e\olution .. rather than "re\olution .. bccan1c the ideology of tnost b1hour groups: a VIc\\' the railwayn1cn had held for a tnuch longer tirnc.
In March llJIX the railwayn1cn rnadc their final deci..,ion although they had been involved frorn the beginning. A resolution to join the TWAB was carried unanimously. No doubt their decision was a n:liefto Roberts. who knew that without the railwaymen 's nun1erical strength. a viable transport workers· organisation could not exist.
Pressures from within Unity with other labour groups n1ay have developed naturally but lack of unity within ASRS ranks was a continuing problen1. Since 190R. the union had heen under the guidance of a Dorninion-wide executive. Quarterly executive n1eetings were held hut policy decisions were reserved for triennial conferences which elected the 7 executive memhcrs. These 7 individuals represented approxirnately X 000 rnemhers -a clear detnonstration of power being concentrated in a small nun1her of hands.
Much of the flavour of the union's policies can he attributed to the personalities of its leaders. General Secretary. Joe Mack. was the only paid union official and was in charge of the day-to-day organisation of the union. An ardent supporter of prohibition. his views were frequently conservative. a fact which occasionally irritated some of the rnernbers. Nevertheles .. . Mack had persuasive powers and could usually convince the n1embership of the validity of his views.
The union's president since 1915. Richard Harnpton. was also sornewhat conservative and could persuade. In 1913. fortunate circurnstances and a laudable list of achievements had resulted in little animosity het\\'een the executive and rnemhership. But the balance changed in 1915 and n1ernbership hegan to den1and n1ore acountability. For Harnpton and Mack. the solution was sirnple -touring the country hy train and haranguing the n1crnhers.
Dissatisfaction with the executive's performance took 2 n1ain forrns. First. the railway tradesn1en felt they were not being represented. Secondly. many n1en1hers wanted n1ore rnoney and. in their view. the executive was doing little to achieve this.
In May 1915. trad esme n 's representatives n1et with the ASRS executive and argued that they were worse off th a n they had heen 2 years previously . Executive n1etnhers offered little syrnpa thy and little was heard from the tradesrnen until August the following year. This titne the tradesrnen made representations to a Railways Cornmitt~e convened to exan1ine their request to be recognised as an independent association. Unfortunately. for the tradesmen. their argun1ents failed to convince the Con11ni ttee and their request ~·as refused. Meanwhile. n1any other n1embers were dissatisfied with the executive's perforrnance. Branch irritation at the executive's lack of action over the rising co. t of living was escalating and rnany were considering taking matters into their own hands.
But angry rhetoric on the part of the branches carne to an abrupt end in May 1916. The Governn1ent. perhaps sensing the growing dissatisfaction ofpuhlic sector workers. granted a war honus to those whose annual salaries did not exceed £.300. For Second Division railwayn1en this represented an increase of one shilling per day-the tirst pay increase since I 9 I 2 for rn o s t of the 111 .
The war bonus was greeted with general satisfaction by the ASRS executive-hut not for long. Soon they realised how little they had received. Between 1912 and 1916 prices had risen hy 24.5 percent: the average railwayman 's salary increased hy only 10 percent as a result of the llJI6 war bonus. By November llJ16. angry statements by railwaymen regarding the cost of living were being heard once more.
The persistence of old problems and the emergence of new ones I ronical_ly. it was the Gove~n men t's conscription pol icy which provided the inspiration for a ne~ solution to the workers problems. The idea that wealth should he conscripted gained considerable support throughout the trade union movement during the second half of 1916 an? to¥ether with the "~ne Big Union" ideology. it hegan to dominate the pages of leading un1on Journals. The rat1o~ale was cl~ar. Farmers were receiving high prices for their produce hut the workers had to tighten thc1r helts for the war effort. Wage increases had proved Per~uading the politician..; that thi~ view had n1erit hecarnc a central ~oc~s <>.f CSSA acti\ity. A petition advocating sociali">ation of foodstuff production and dtstnhutton w~ts prc~entcd to Parliarnent and a comn1ittee to inve\itigatc the cost of living forn1ed. An1ong t~s suggestions. the con11nittee advocated the appointment of a Food Controller to control retatl prices hut unfortunately for the workers. this recon1 n1 enda tion was never implen1ented.
Meanwhile. the ASRS rnen1hers and other worker~ took rnatters into their own hands. Articles ad\ocating co-operative societies began appearing in Railway review. Co-operation. according to their author. would enable workers to both produce and sel l their own goods and thus u ndern1 i ne the power of the .. monopolist".~ Despite in i tia I reservations. the concept was successfully tried in Novernher 1917 with a coal and firewood business. Railwa ymen. it secn1ed. were bent on creating their own brand of socialisn1.
However. radical socia li st thinking was not the reason for ASRS n1en1bers' interest in cooperation. Neither did it underpin their demands for the socialisation of production and distribution or foodstuffs. Instead. if wages could not go up. prices \\'Ould have to Corne down. More radical goals were not on the agenda. The ASRS executive viewed a labour rnovement run on class lines as being as "scl fish as capitali sm itself' (Railway review. 1 uly 27 I Y 17. p. 315 ).
Rather an ideology of putting railwaymen's needs first and labelling thern .. the con1n1on good" prevailed.
This attitude wa~ clearly dcn1onstrated Juring the 1917 coal n1iners' strike. When coal supplies di1ninished and train services were curtailed. so tn e railwayn1en did not get paid. Ob\iousl) the ~trike was not in ASRS interests. However. nowhere was this probkrn 1nentioned. In stead. the ··official" ASRS view regarded the strike as a neglect of duty.
The )Car 1'1 17 also brought a new problen1. The Defence DepartnH~nt wanted people in the war: the New Zealand public wanted an improved railway service. Labelled by the rail~ayn1en as .. the double pressure ... this new difficulty resulted in there being fewer railv.ayrnen to do rnore work. Further pressures \Vere created by resignation~. Poor \vages. working conditions and the increased availability of jobs elsewhere encouraged this trend. The effect ofthe . . . . e new pressure . . . . resulted in furthercon1plaints fron1 ASRS rnen1hers and ne\v policie~ frotn Go\ernn1ent and the Railways l)epart tnent. Mernbers of the Governn1ent Railway . . . . Superannuation Fund were forbidden frorn retiring without the Minister's consent and wotnen\ labour was used to overcon1e the shortage oftnen. ASRS rnetnber~ found both policies unacceptable.
In a deliberate attempt to discourage further resignations and assist those with farnily responsibilities. an extra shilling per day was granted to all tnarried railwayrnen frorn Occen1ber 191 7. A further shilling per da) \va~ granted to all state servants fron1 I October 191 X.
Re~ignations kll and the Go\ernn1ent felt sorne degree of success had been achieved. To the ASRS.little had changed. Bet'"een 1912 and 1919 wage. had increased by 30 percent but prices had increc.hed by 53 percent. Working conditions had deteriorated and the old problen1" of the di\ision barrier and lack of political rights rernained.
Ne\erthele"'"-· the ASRS had reaped son1c benefits. Bonds had been forn1ed with fellow state sef\anl"> and fellow transport workers. As a holly. the ASRS had becorne stronger and more unified. Certain !] n1ernbership had declined due to the war and resignations. but by the beginning of 19llJ. X2 percent of the Second I)ivision now belonged. This was an in1111ense improvernent over 191~ when the proportion wa . . . . only :)l) percent.
With a strong union. man) grie\ances. and the end or the war. expectations were high. To the ASRS. the UO\Crninent had run out or excu . . . . e . . . . -it was time for their grievances to be ren1edied.
. . . . ,
Disappointment
When tht.· \\ttr ended in No\crnbcr 19lX. the age-old clain1s were joined hy new ones. United State~ rail\\tt]n1en had recent!) achieved the R hour day and the ASRS wantt:d this 4 The ler n. 1 " mor_ H>polt..,(' is ln.:4uently mentioned in the ASRS journal Rai/·way review and other puhlH..at1ons of the t11nc l! nfortunatdy, it tenLls to mean different thing:-. to Jifferent writL'rs and is thcrdore amh1guou-. It ,.., reao.;onahle to <h-.ume that the usual connotation of the term was " farmer·· ot "per-.on "upplying produce to the urban area~". In any con text. it wa~ u:-.ed to refer to;. per\on \\ho L'Xplotted the \)\LCm pulling "busine!'s lirst and patrioti-.m second ... The Prince and the railwaymen 7 policy to apply to Nt!w Zealand. They also wanted an opportunity for short-tenn placcn1ents in other count rics for practica 1 experic nee.
However. industrial muscle \Vas not going to be used to achieve any ofthc'\c goals. Firstly. since the Government could no longer usc the war as an excu~c. the ASRS full; expected their Jenutnds to be met. Secondly. radical atternpls at attaining redre~s had not been u~cd during the war. and in the executive council's view. there was little reason to use them now. A further reason why the ASRS executive thought their requests would he granted was the appointn1ent of a new General Manager. R W McVilly. who had come up through the New Zealand railways. and was regarded as more sympathetic to ASRS claims.
The railwaymcn's optimism rapidly gave way to disappointment. The Governn1ent had decided that no changes could be made until ·· post war conditions were known ..... the financial position analysed .. and the feelings of the railway workers returning from the war .. taken into account ... The railwayrnen were furious . Rank and file anger resulted in the executive drawing up a list of proposed c.unendments to the Schedule of the Government Railways Act 1908 (effectively the railway workers' award). While they debated the size of a desirable wage increase with the n1embcrship. the Government made its decision : the 3 war bonuses were to he added to the tnen 's permanent wages. The executive were satisfied.
The men1hership received little consultation. The executive scarcely made an attempt to seek rank and file views. Instead the rnernhcrship had to he persuaded the Governn1ent's decision was right. This was done in the normal fashion. Members' representatives were gathered together: executive men1bers applied their oratorical skills and finally the delegates were asked to vote. As usual. the executive won with a large majority and promised to move for other improven1ents as soon as the opportunity offered.
The in1portance of .. being seen to he doing something" had also encouraged the executive council to stre ngthen its links with the TWAB. ASRS affiliation had greatly increased the Board·s numerical s trength and Jim Roberts' dream of "One Union -One Industry" was becoming a reality.
However. the railwayme n's ideology and that of Roberts were somewhat different. Roberts advocated worker ownership of the means of production and ""One Union-One Industry .. was a prerequisite for the realisation of this goal. The ASRS supported the "One Union-One Industry" goal because of its desire to he the on ly union for the railway service. Although Roth (1973. p. 13). has implied that the ASRS involvernent in the Transport Workers' Federation encouraged the railwaymen to he more radical. there is a shortage of evidence to support this view. Rather the ASRS was solely interested in meeting its own need s. The EFCA undermined its strength and was therefore undesirable. ASRS memhers needed proof their executive was doing so mething about their problems. And here the ASRS's commitn1ent to the Transport Workers' Federation ended.
If the executive's attempts at .. doing sornething" cheered the n1embers a little. their happiness did not last for long. Chronic staff shortages (which were exacerbated by the 191~-19 influenza epidemic). resulted in men working long hours for poor wages. Indeed. the months following the end of the war involved little change. ASRS members· conditions remained poor: their relationship with the departmental management worsened. Ironically it was an attempt by Government to correct the prohlems they faced which precipitated the strike. It is to an examination of these final events that we now turn.
Precipitating events
The events which took place immediately prior to the strike are not extraordinary on their o_wn: Only when they are added to the weight of existing difficulties do they hecon1e srgnrfica nt. Discontent was intensified by a new factor: The Governn1ent Railways Amend~ent Bill which was introduced into the House of Representdtivcs in September 1919. In fact. tt was the events triggered by this BilL that were the immediate cause of the strike.
Government had realised the seriousness of the railway situation. Despite a Parlianlentary debate regarding ~he state of the railways in November 191R. still no in1proven1ent had occurr~d by t~c_followrng September. Clearly somet hing had to he done and William Massey. th e Pnmc Mrntster. took over the railways portfolio himself.
Massey set up a select committee to inquire into the railway service. which in turn recommended the formation of a further committee. A Wages Board was established to·· ... Reluctantly the ASRS agreed to the plan. Mack \Vas nominated as the society's representative on the Board leaving Hampton to act as ASRS advocate before the Board. Following argun1enh O\er whether the press ~hould he invited and the suitability of the Railways Department advocate. the hearing finally began on 26 January 1920. Hampton argued that railwaymen were receiving insufficient wages. their hours were appa lling and. as a result experienced men were leaving the departrnent. The departn1ental advocate disagreed. Undaunted. Han1pton continued. The ASRS wanted sick and accident pay. the 44 hour week. overtime before 8an1 and after 5pm. the ren1oval of the divi"ional harrier and representation at management le\el. The department's attitude wa-., simple: none of these concessions was \\arran ted.
On March 6 1920. l month and 6 days after the hearing had been completed. the chairman relea\cd his report. The report recommended a l shilling per day cost of living bonus for married n1en but failed to addre-.,..._ any of the other grievances. Mr Justice Stringer's decision \\as that such matters were ( 1) oubide the order\ of reference and (2) about situations of which he had no expert knowledge. The rail~ayn1en were incredulous.
New\ of the rail \ef\ice's discontent reached Massey. A Treasury report was published "'tating that if railwaytnen \ wages were raised. taxes would abo have to be increased. The ASRS wa" uninlprc'lsed. As a counter-attack. the executive council published a report in Railway review indicating that many freight rates had not been increased for 25 years. Meanwhile. a deputation to Parliament requested the dispute he investigated h) a hody consisting of repre'lentati\es of the parties involved and a n1utually agreed chairman, as was pro\ ided hy the Lahou r Di"'pu tes lnvestiga tion Act 1913. Representations were also made directly to Ma"'"'e) regarding the Stringer Report's inadequacy and a reply was eagerly aVtaited A letter arri\ed on 22 April 1920. 2 da)s before the Prince of Wales disen1barked in AucklanJ. Stringer\ recornn1endation \\Ould appl) until June 1920 when a nev. commission. hut \Vithout a n1utuall) agreed chairman. would inquire into wages. The letter made no mention of working conJitions
The executi\e council were at a lo~~ O\erwhat to do. Mack weakly suggested that .. a clin1ax (was) at hand" hut could not offer any more definite reaction. Helplessly he aJdeJ: "I feel sure the men will ne\er accept the con1mission proposed" (Railway review 30 April 1920. p. 1 S9).
Mack n1ay have never reali~ed the prophetic nature of his words. In less than a week. too ls were down, train~ were stopped and the Prince n1arooned. The strike had begun.
Strike
The 19 1 0 '-.trike was not initiated by the ASRS Ironicall} it \\as begun hy the EFCA who had \0\\ed. in 1909. never to use the strike as a v.eapon against the Governn1ent-son1ething e\cn the ASRS had ne\cr done'" On TuesJa) April27. the EFCA sent a tekgran1 to the Prime Mini~ter \tating that ·'Locomoti\e n1en had unanin1ously decided to cease work at midnight .. :· (New Zealand tinu~s. 2X April 1920. p. 5 ).
The ASRS was initially n1ost con fused . Because of year~ of n1 u tua l a nin1osi t-y· hetv.·een the 2 unions. the Ff.CA haJ failed to inform the ASRS of its intentions. However. rnost AS RS n1en1hers refu..,_cJ to work frorn the moment the strike began. It was not until ) executive However. the railwaymen were not about to change their minds -a fact Massey soon realised. Following a special Cabinet meeting in Rotorua. he was hastily driven to Wellington to meet representatives from both organisations.
For the most part. railway services in the North Island ceased. First Division officers were requested to run trains but. in an unusual display of solidarity. they chose to support their colleagues. Should the strike he successful. no doubt some of their own grievances would he resolved.
Public reaction to the strike was mixed. From the upheaval that was created. it is curious that the railwaymen received any public syn1pathy at all. Passengers were stranded. food prices soared. steamers were delayed and the Railways Department lost £5 000 per day (New Zealand tin1es. 30 April 1920. p . 5) . Despite all this. little anirnosity was directed toward the strikers. Instead. concern surrou nded the Royal Tour. The New Zealand Education Boards' A sociation appealed to the railwaymen not to deprive the nation ·s children of a chance to meet the Prince. The New Zealand tin1es agreed:
while the merits are not in question. the railwaymen s h o uld wait until after the Tour has ended (New Zealand times. 30 April 1920. p.5 ).
Ironi cally. it was the Prince who solved the problem-he would .. willingly give up the 3 days proposed for deer-stalking" in order that the children would not miss out (ibid. 30 April 1920. p. 5 ).
The strike hy the ASRS was short-lived. A conference between the union and Massey was held on Friday April 30 and an agrcen1ent was reached in less than 30 minutes. The ASRS strike was over.
The EFCA was furious . In their view the ASRS had demanded too little and given in too easi ly. The EFCA wanted retrospection for any pay increase and its fight was n ot over yet. Nevertheless. a strike by the EFCA without the s upport of the ASRS was untenable. and on Monday Ma y 3. EFCA members returned to work.
Neither union demanded immediate concessions. The ASRS agreed to have its grievances investigated under the Labour Disputes Investigation Act 1913. In its view a rnutually agreed chairman and an opportunity for discussion of all the issues deemed relevant was sufficient. Radical demands were never made. On June 2 the commission. chaired by G B Bullock. Don1inion Superintendent of the New Zealand Shipping Company. reached an agreement on new wages and conditions for railway workers. Provision s made included the following: -a 3 s hilling per day increase for the Second Division: -improved status of casual workers: -increased availability of free pa sses~ -the 44 hour week: -improved overtime and night rates: -double pay on selected statutory holidays: -improved promotion prospects .
. Political rights and an end to the divisional barrier were missing from the li st but the men d1d not see m to mind. This time the executive gave members the choice: if the agreement did not suit. they were free to reject it. But the agreement did suit. For the first time in 7 years. the New Zealand Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants was content.
PM Revell

Conclusion
Aprii2X. 1920 signalled the end of an era for the ASRS. It did not represent a.r~dical change in the union's pol icy. First. we n1 ust rcn1en1 bcr that the EFCA had struck first g1v1ng the ASRS little option. Either they joined in or they defeated a strike that was directly in their interests. Never before had they been in such a position. Secondly. the railwaymen·s concern remained confined to their own interests and their own conception of the "common good ... They were apologetic about disrupting the Royal Tour and. had the choice been theirs. they may well have rescheduled the timing of the strike. Nevertheless. Mack justified the strike as being consistent with the con1n1on interest:
... we: think that the Government and the department will understand us better in the future than they apparently have done in the: past. and this must he in the hest interests of the public and all concerned (N('W ~ealand rimes. I May 1~20. p. 4).
Thirdly. the railwayrnen had never pron1ised to abjure strike methods. rather. the strike had always been the railwaynH~n ·s last weapon of defence. This had been clearly demontrated by the railwayrnen·s actions in the years prior to 1920. In 1913. the ASRS had little use for the strike weapon : any benefits had been outweighed hy their associated costs. Over the years this balance had been altered and. in 1920. the railwaymen had little to lose. Although every available co nstitutional n1ethod of redress had been tried. all had failed.
To surn rna ri se. in the eyes of t:te New Zealand public. the Government. the Railways Oepartrnent. and the Transport Work• s· Federation. the editor of Railway review was correct:
the railwaymen of New Zealand (had) cut the Gordian knot-the} (had) abandoned their time honou r~d pol icy of peaceful negotiation . . . and they (had) hrough t themselves in to li nc: with other classe~ of lahou r hy adopting the strike as a last resort (Railway rew·ew. 2R Ma} IY20. p. 257 ).
In reality ASRS policy had never altered. Postscript ASRS policy did changl' after the 1920 strike. Every rnernber had witne!'sed the effecti\cne~s of rnilitant tactics and 1110!-it were willing to strike should the occa~ion ari c .
. In 1924. II 000 ASRS m~mhers downed tools in an effort to gain hctterwages. This tirne the Pnnce was absent and the Prirne Minis terwa!' not crnharrassed. In addition the EFCA did not \Upport the strike. Th e railway trade srnen finally split frorn the ASRS. forn1ed the Railv.a\ Trade, men ·s Associ a lion and VOWel: never to use the strike weapon. The strike failed. Within a week wo rk resumed and many of the gains rnade in 1920 were lost. This tirne the LOSb outweighed th e benefits-a fact the ASRS only realised when it wa~ too late.
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